This article suggests that the gist of securities market disclosure is the furtherance of corporate governance and not investor protection. It will be argued that public enforcement of continuous disclosure rules remains the primary means of enforcement in Singapore. But this should be supplemented by private enforcement. While jurisdictions like the U.K. have introduced legislation loosely mirroring 10b-5 actions in the U.S., allowing investors to seek compensation largely from issuers (and their insurers), recent literature suggests this is a suboptimal solution, given that any damages are ultimately borne by existing shareholders. Courts also face difficulties in conceptualising or quantifying shareholder losses since these are derived from information concerning the assets and prospects of the underlying company. But Singapore courts have shown that it is possible to treat corporate misstatements as a form of fraud against the entity, where generous causation and remoteness rules are available to measure the damages suffered by the corporation.
I. Continuous Disclosure: Public and Private Enforcement
Investors take the risk of poor management and this is usually not something for the courts to decide but for investment analysts to pick up, and investors to inform themselves about. 1 In the more egregious cases, however, directors may be sued for wrongdoing, including negligence, although investors would find it hard to succeed 2 or even to have standing to commence an action. The proper plaintiff in such cases is usually the company, unless a shareholder can show that a duty of care was owed to him or her due to a special circumstance. Does or should that special circumstance exist at common law where corporate disclosure is concerned, or is it something that is implicitly recognised in the relevant statutory provisions in Singapore such as * have faced problems with funding. 15 It was the late Professor Galbraith that said that regulators were " [v] igorous in youth, rapidly turning complacent in middle age, before either becoming senile or an arm of the industry they are meant to regulate." In any case, it is not immediately obvious why wealth should be shifted from shareholders to the regulators which is the case particularly in a treble civil penalties regime such as exists in section 232 of the Securities and Futures Act (Singapore) that we shall see serves, alongside criminal actions, as the only enforcement mechanisms in Singapore. Regulators in the U.K. have also had problems with the high burden of proof in obtaining civil penalties for market abuse, 16 and in Australia, the ASIC may not know what matters will be raised by the defence as the court does not order discovery in such actions. 17 In Singapore, there have also been problems enforcing judgments for civil penalties obtained in foreign jurisdictions. 18 Still, there should be a necessary range of sanctions with the public ones at the top and private enforcement lower down the hierarchy, but with the caveat that this should mainly be by the issuer corporation against the wrongdoers that create fraudulent disclosures, rather than by shareholders against those wrongdoers or, which is usually the case in the U.S. under their 10b-5 securities fraud actions, and now expressly provided in the U. (discussing the "relative poverty" of the SEC at 15-16). 16 See supra note 7. This may be a result of the quasi-criminal nature of market abuse, and may not be the case with breaches of the Disclosure Rules and Transparency Rules of the U.K. Listing Authority. 17 See Austin, supra note 12 at 20. 18 Although the Securities and Futures Act (Singapore) states clearly that the civil burden of proof applies in the case of ss. 232 and 234, these provisions may still be seen as criminal in nature by a foreign court enforcing the action, which is how the Singapore court classified a U.S. While disclosure is a management decision, it seems to be qualitatively different from, say, a decision whether to invest in new plant or equipment. Disclosure is described by Zohar Goshen and Gideon Parchomovsky as one of the three pillars of securities regulation, alongside restrictions on fraud and manipulation, and proscriptions on insider trading. This creates a competitive market for analysts or professional investors, which in turn helps police against breaches of the duty of care on the part of directors. 22 So disclosure has a crucial role in market efficiency as well as corporate governance, 23 which is sometimes lost in the powerful rhetoric of investor protection. For example, investor protection is the first of three general objectives in securities regulation expounded by the International Organisation of Securities Commissions ("IOSCO"). 24 Countries such as Australia and the United Kingdom have adopted the three IOSCO objectives without modification. In Singapore, however, investor protection is not mentioned as one of the objectives of market regulation in section 5 of the Securities and Futures Act (Singapore), which was introduced by the Securities and Futures (Amendment) Act 2005 , and has in its place the objective of facilitating "efficient markets for the allocation of capital and the transfer of risks." Consequently, ensuring that markets are "fair, orderly and transparent", which was largely the second IOSCO objective, but listed first in section 5(a) of the Securities and Futures Act (Singapore), appears to be the primary objective in Singapore. 25 However, the move towards a disclosure-based regime must not be seen as a fundamental shift in philosophy-it should be recognised that the disclosure philosophy has permeated securities regulation in Singapore to varying degrees since at least 1974. In that year, it was said by the then Minister for Finance, Mr. Hon Sui Sen, at the Second Reading of the Companies (Amendment) Bill, that "[d]isclosure of information is an essential part of the working of a free the effect of which is to require the payment of money. But both show the need for clear definition of claimable amount, which is the problem an investor claimant faces under the Securities The public will be reminded time and again that the primary responsibility for making investment decisions lies with themselves and, over time, they will be able to learn to be able to look out for their own interest. There is no alternative. We have to shift. We cannot go on the basis that the regulator, or MAS, or the [Singapore Exchange] will make sure that every investment is safe and sure to make money. If you want to invest, you have to make your own judgment, find out your own information and make your own decisions. 27 In contrast, in its introduction in the U.S. by the Securities Act 1933 (U.S.), President Roosevelt spoke in support of the disclosure philosophy by stating that " [t] his proposal adds to the ancient rule of caveat emptor ['Let the buyer beware'] the further doctrine: 'Let the seller also beware' [caveat venditor]. It puts the burden of telling the whole truth on the seller." While the 1933 Act focused on the primary market, the Transparency Directive (E.U.) (which focus is on continuous disclosure) recitals state quite clearly that disclosure is for investor protection. 28 In Singapore, however, the corporate governance basis for continuous disclosure was emphasised in an important sentencing decision, for which the defendant pleaded guilty to breaches of sections 199 and 203 of the Securities and Futures Act (Singapore) (amongst other offences). In Public Prosecutor v. Chen Jiulin, 29 the facts of which are discussed below, 30 the Court made the following observation:
As a general sentencing consideration, it is well accepted that our securities market is market driven, and subscribes to a disclosure-based regulatory regime. Encouraging good corporate governance is vital to the integrity, efficiency and transparency of our securities market as well as for the protection of investors. Timely corporate disclosure is an essential feature of our corporate governance. Market manipulation, false trading and the making of false statements severely distort the true nature of the market. Such actions are viewed seriously …. 
III. Singapore Position
Section 203 of the Securities and Futures Act (Singapore), which came into being with the passing of that piece of legislation in 2002, creates what in Singapore is the main regulatory offence for breaching the continuous disclosure rules of a securities exchange. Liability is triggered by intentional, reckless or (in the case of civil penalties and compensatory claims only) negligent behaviour. Under section 232, the MAS may seek to obtain civil penalties amounting to three times the amount of the profit made or loss avoided by the contravening person, which in the case of section 203 is the issuer corporation. Where no such profit is made or loss avoided, which is usually the case in a failure by an issuer to satisfy the continuous disclosure requirements in section 203, the MAS is empowered to obtain up to $2 million as a civil fine. 31 For investors, section 234 permits all persons suffering a loss while trading contemporaneously with a contravening person to recover a 'maximum recoverable amount' from the contravening person, which is the amount of profit made or loss avoided by the contravening person. If a court, utilising the guidelines on the meaning of contemporaneity, 32 finds that there are numerous such investors, each of them will not recover a substantial amount based on the statutory limit. But in any case, since the contravening person for the purposes of the continuous disclosure rule in section 203 is the issuer company itself, which may not have made a profit or avoided a loss from failure to disclose material information unless it was also issuing new shares at the same time, investors will usually be unable to recover anything at all. This has been criticised by a number of academics in Singapore, as has the fact that that there is no presumption of reliance or fraud on the market concept to help with the formation of securities class actions. 33 But it is consistent with a weak investor protection philosophy in Singapore.
Section 199, which prohibits a person from making false statements that are likely to affect the trading of securities or their market price, however, attributes liability to the maker of the statement, which could be the corporation in cases of periodic financial statements, or an individual officer or director making a specific disclosure on behalf of the entity. In the former case, any claim under section 234 by investors would face the same concomitant problems as above. There have, however, been instances where an individual has clearly made misstatements on behalf of the company, 34 the Securities and Futures Act (Singapore). This latter provision imposes criminal liability on an officer of a body corporate where an offence has been created by a body corporate which "is proved to have been committed with the consent or connivance of, or to be attributable to any neglect on the part" of the officer. But where direct, as opposed to derived, individual liability is concerned, it will be seen below that it is still possible to impose such liability on the individual where the standard of liability in section 199 is recklessness, a subjective standard, as opposed to the objectivity of negligence. Here, the nature of the action is perhaps less focused on continuous disclosure and more on preventing fraud but section 234 would again limit investor compensation to the wrongdoer's gain or loss avoidance, of which there may still be none. Section 199 breaches in Singapore have so far been prosecuted through criminal actions. 35 PP v. Chen Jiulin provides a good example in the Singapore context of the possible defendants in a securities fraud case, although here involving state criminal, as well as, civil regulatory enforcement. China Aviation Oil Holding Company ("CAOHC") sold 15% of its stake in its subsidiary CAO (Singapore) to investors through a private placement at the time when it possessed non-public information affecting the subsidiary. CAOHC had undertaken this share placement in order to raise capital to help CAO (Singapore) meet margin calls resulting from over-thecounter oil derivative trading. CAOHC knew of the losses at its subsidiary (which its own independent directors did not), and had to pay a civil penalty of $8m to the MAS under section 232 for breaching the insider trading provisions of the Securities and Futures Act (Singapore). 36 Where continuous disclosure was concerned, none of its realised losses were disclosed to the Singapore Exchange (SGX) as required under section 203(2). Nor were the realised and unrealised losses captured in CAO (Singapore)'s half year and third quarter financial statements, for which the corporation was in breach of section 199(c)(i) of the Securities and Futures Act (Singapore). For consenting to such non-disclosure and misleading statements, its CEO Chen Jiulin pleaded guilty under section 331, read with the two relevant offence creating provisions. He was fined $330,000 for the section 199 offence and jailed for 3 months for the section 203 offence, but this was because the fact situations overlapped-there were 6 charges altogether, with 9 others taken into consideration. In all, Chen was sentenced to four years and three months' imprisonment and fined $335,000. Yet CAO (Singapore) faced neither a civil penalty claim by the MAS, nor criminal prosecution for its misstatements. While too much should not be read into this, it does show that the corporation itself is often not the right defendant in a situation where its shares are closely held by a major shareholder if the rationale for making it pay is deterrence. This will be more fully set out in the next Part.
Consequently, the continuous disclosure provisions in Singapore are in effect enforced through a mix of public sanctions against the issuer company (sections 35 Davies' study was, however, premised on an Anglo-American model of corporation, which may not generally exist in the Singapore context. 43 For example, he states that poor disclosure is usually the result of directors trying to do what they believe is in the company's interest, i.e., to keep the company afloat by not disclosing bad news. 44 There is an assumption of dispersed shareholdings here and with it little structural bias, with the latter having been defined by Claire Hill and Brett McDonnell as a bias against the corporate interest and one in favour of one of the constituencies within the corporation, such as management or controlling shareholders. 45 But the insider type companies that exist outside the U.S. and U.K. are quite different in that disclosure can be held back or inaccurate for more extrinsic reasons. It remains a fact that U.S.-listed companies have far greater dispersal of shareholdings than Singapore ones, even if it has been argued recently that it is less dispersed than was thought. But the empirical evidence there only shows that in the U.S., 59.74% of U.S. corporations have "controlling shareholders" who hold at least 10% of the shares. 46 The starting point here is quite different, as most listed companies are held by major shareholders who control about 60 to 70% of the shares. 47 In Singapore, minority shareholder protection is important as realistically the board will prioritise the interests of the major shareholder. 48 The more specific point here though is that the shareholder interests are not aligned, and so it becomes more difficult to conceive of the corporation as a separate entity that ought to be liable because of disclosures made on its behalf by its directors. These disclosures do This was in the context of director liability (to the corporation), where the argument was that structural bias (there favouring management) should make it easier to prove their bad faith. Here the structural bias (directors favouring major shareholders) is also used to argue that the corporation should not be the defendant in disclosure actions as it cannot be seen as a separate entity benefitting from the decisions of the directors. This article argues that, even in cases of disclosure violations, the proper plaintiff is the corporation and the directors should be the defendants. 46 not only have external effects but also affect the different corporate constituencies internally, specifically by affecting their investment decisions in the case of shareholders. 49 Thus, in Singapore, in a recent case on prospectus disclosure, Auston International v. Public Prosecutor 50 the judge, on appeal, thought that the CEO and CFO were really liable rather than the company, even though at common law it has been held that a company remains liable even where a prospectus had been prepared by professionals. 51 For such disclosure both the issuer and directors are clearly statutorily liable under sections 253 (criminal) and 254 (civil) of the Securities and Futures Act (Singapore) as the prospectus speaks directly to the incoming shareholders, which may not be the case with continuing disclosure, but Lee Seiu Kin J. severely reduced the fine that had been imposed on the issuer on the basis that a deterrent sentence had no effect on the corporation, as opposed to the individuals managing it. 52 While the investor protection rationale is more important than corporate governance and structural bias concerns where prospectus disclosure is involved, the case recognises that in closed companies the separate entity is not a monolithic whole, and liability should attach to a more culpable constituency within it. 53 There are further structural problems created if the remedy for disclosure violations is targeted at the fictional separate entity. In ASIC v. Chemeq, 54 French J. said:
It may also be relevant to consider the impact, if any, on shareholders when a penalty is sought against a corporation. Penalties imposed on officers of the corporation for their part in such contraventions affect those officers alone. Penalties imposed on the corporation may affect shareholders including those who have become shareholders on a set of assumptions induced by the very non-disclosure complained of. In some cases it is possible also that creditors may be affected. Who then is being deterred when only the corporation is penalised? I am not sure that there is a satisfactory answer to this concern within the present statutory scheme. One might imagine that if a penalty is to be significant to a corporation 49 Poorer disclosure could lead to less liquidity which reduces the value of shares: Fox it will also be significant to its shareholders in its impact on the capital which backs their shares. In a company with capitalisation as high as that of Chemeq, the impact on individual shareholders may be insignificant. The penalties that count most are likely to be those imposed on the responsible individuals. Nevertheless the law as presently framed requires the assumption that the contravening corporation is a person distinct from its shareholders and that it can be deterred by the imposition of appropriate penalties.
More recently, in the U.S., Rakoff J. in the Southern District of New York rejected the settlement under which the Bank of America would pay the SEC a fine of US$33 million for disclosure violations in its merger with Merrill Lynch (concerning bonuses payable to the latter's executives), stating that "[t]his proposal to have the victim of the violation pay an additional penalty for their own victimisation was enough to give this court pause." 55 If the remedy for disclosure violations is not properly tailored, a group or generation of shareholders may end up losing twice over, particularly if they are unable to be part of the plaintiff group (for reasons such as a failure to prove reliance, which is a hurdle in most jurisdictions other than the U.S., discussed in the next Part). This issue will be discussed further when we examine why investors should not be the plaintiffs in most securities disclosure litigation and is something that Davies acknowledged in his Final Report. However, he thought that issuer liability under section 90A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (U.K.) ought to remain because "fraud is so corrosive of the basic trust on which the market operates that civil liability for such statements performs a valuable public function in deterring fraud." 56 It has also been said that existing shareholders that hold on to the shares instead of trading actively should still ultimately bear the loss that arises when the company pays as they have a role and responsibility in monitoring fraud, and their indirect liability gives them an incentive to do this properly. 57 However, the countervailing argument is that the shareholders have little power at the moment, particularly in the U.S., to remove directors, and in any case the board itself may not control management. 58 Also, the focus on shareholders is usually on their rights, and here we are imposing an obligation on them to monitor, with all the attendant collective action problems. Further, in insider type companies, the major shareholder will be the one in control of the board, and so there is little reason to make minorities responsible for a share of the compensation paid by the corporation for the misleading disclosures that are made by or with the knowledge of the major shareholder. Indeed, it may be that major shareholders that are privy to disclosure violations should be formally recognised as 55 
SEC v. Bank of America Corporation (2009) Civ 6829 (S.D.N.Y.). The actions discussed here were all
regulatory in nature and in this context the SEC conceded that they would usually "go after the company executives who were responsible", but it did not do so here as the evidence clearly showed that the misleading disclosures were drafted by lawyers on behalf of the bank. 56 , and in any case in an outsider system, it would be highly unusual for a shareholder to have any significant degree of involvement in the disclosure mechanisms of a listed company. That, though, is not the case in Singapore and much can be said for imposing direct liability on controlling shareholders involved in disclosure violations even where they do not trade whilst in possession of inside information. In any case, incentives for existing shareholders to improve corporate governance also exist where the corporation is the plaintiff, and the mechanism for them to achieve this is the statutory derivative action, and where the costs are borne by the company. 59 This is discussed later at Part V.B.
B. Existing Difficulties of Class Actions against Issuer:
Reliance and Causation
It appears that the U.K. has not gone about the implementation of the Transparency Directive (E.U.) in the specific instance of section 90A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (U.K.) with great enthusiasm. We have seen that Davies stressed that public enforcement is still the main avenue to prosecute breaches of continuous disclosure. He also expressed some scepticism regarding private enforcement, and its remedial consequences, but was assuaged by the fact that liability is based on a fraud threshold, which will be examined in the next Part. But, perhaps most importantly, section 90A is difficult for large groups of shareholders to actually use, in that there is the need to show reasonable reliance, 60 i.e., that the claimants were induced to act by the deceit or misrepresentation by the issuer. This is the common law position which does not trouble the present prospectus disclosure regime, 61 and which many U.S. )) read with section 1041I (which allows a person who suffers loss or damage because of conduct "in relation to a financial product or a financial service" that is misleading or deceptive to recover against the wrongdoer) clearly allows investors a cause of action against the statement maker for losses caused by the misstatement, and the question of reliance and its presumption has been discussed in the courts 64 the Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee 65 and by academics. 66 But, even in the U.S., securities class actions have been under attack since at least Basic. 67 And, in cases where corporate statements are not made to an efficient market, where fraud on the market cannot be utilised, the U.S. Supreme Court has recently required a strong form of reliance in Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 68 and stated that the use of common law analogies could in fact wrongly expand the the price of securities (rather than on the investment decisions of the reasonable investor). Langevoort is "not averse to the idea of addressing materiality as a matter of law," and not fact: Langevoort The defendants in Stoneridge were counterparties that placed advertisements with the issuer to boost the latter's advertising revenue. In return, the issuer overpaid for cable boxes that the defendants sold, and documents were backdated to cover up the fact that no net revenue was generated by the arrangement.
scope of 10b-5 liability. 69 In contrast, the earlier decision in Basic had warned that the common law should not be used to unduly restrict the scope of the statutory claim. 70 In any case, we will see that the presumption of reliance may not help much as Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo 71 requires the proof of actual decline in share prices due to the inaccurate disclosures, as opposed to overvaluation at the time of purchase, in order to sue for securities fraud. The Supreme Court stated that "as a matter of pure logic, at the moment the transaction takes place, the plaintiff has suffered no loss; the inflated purchase payment is offset by ownership of a share that at that instant possesses equivalent value." 72 Although the reasoning is different, the requirement that the seller may in practice have to sell to crystallise a loss sounds quite similar to the rule in Houldsworth v. City of Glasgow Bank, 73 which requires shareholders to rescind a share purchase before they can claim damages from the company. While that position has been reversed by statute in the U. .) ), it is a rule which may still be applicable in Singapore, given that no such similar provision has been introduced into the Companies Act (Singapore) 74 here. In Australia, it has been held that the rule does not apply to both purchasers on the open market, and even perhaps subscribers for shares, who have statutory claims for deceptive and misleading conduct against a company that has breached its continuous disclosure obligations. 75 Although the rationale for the rule in Houldsworth was capital maintenance, it could in the modern day context be seen as a difficulty with conceptualising a loss when a subscriber still holds onto the shares.
Reliance is thus only one part of causation, i.e., purchase causation, and loss causation still has to be shown. Not separating the two can make it either too easy, or too difficult, to prove a loss. It should be codified and thought it was premature to assume the fraud measure of directness which was something he had appeared to do initially. 81 The U.K. Treasury accepted his recommendation in the Final Report to leave it to the courts but that this would likely mean that "damages are likely to be assessed by reference to the loss caused by reliance on the statement, and not the loss caused by its falsity." 82 This, though, is closer to the fraud measure than what seems to be the position in the U.S. Dura Pharma held that even where there has been a sale, which crystallises the loss, the lower share price at the point of sale could be caused by many different intervening factors and not the relevant information. The U.S. Supreme Court said that:
The lower price after corrective disclosure may reflect, not the earlier misrepresentation, but changed economic circumstances, changed investor expectations, new industry-specific or firm-specific facts, conditions or other events, which taken separately or together account for some or all of the reduced price …. 76 The longer the time period between purchase and sale, the more likely that other factors caused the loss. 83 In its pleadings, a plaintiff is expected to provide the defendants "notice of what the relevant economic loss might be or of what the causal connection might be between that loss and the misrepresentation." 84 The experience of English courts with claims for falls in property prices due to negligent valuations is that it is difficult to measure loss where there is a general market fall. In South Australia Asset Management Corp v. York Montague Ltd., 85 Lord Hoffmann required the plaintiff to "show that the duty was owed to him and that it was a duty in respect of the kind of loss which he has suffered." The language of legal responsibility (or scope of the duty that is broken) has been used particularly in cases of negligence to prevent full recovery of economic losses. But Fisch has pointed out that for common law fraud in the U.S., "courts rarely consider proximate cause extensively." 86 Yet, she grants this is done in cases of securities fraud litigation due to the fact that courts are not sure of the value of the relevant information and its impact on stock prices. 87 contrast, Evans L.J., who expressly applied South Australia, only did so because it was a not a fraudulent breach of fiduciary duty. Mummery L.J.'s approach focusing on the kinds of risk at stake could justify a more stringent loss causation requirement for securities fraud, even if remoteness of damage is treated separately and is based on the rule of directness (and without the need for foreseeability) in Doyle v. Olby (Ironmongers) Ltd. 90 We have a slightly different set of problems with loss measurement in Singapore. Section 234 of the Securities and Futures Act (Singapore) expressly provides that loss is calculated by measuring the difference between the price at which the securities were dealt with in that transaction and their "likely" price if the contravention had not been committed. 91 While this formulation does not work for insider trading, 92 it does provide a clear method of determining loss in cases where there has been a breach of the continuous disclosure requirements in section 203 or the proscription against misleading statements in section 199. But it is not clear that it does away with the need to prove causation or that intervening factors could sever the link between the inflated purchase price and the "likely" price had the disclosures been made promptly and accurately. A more fundamental problem we have seen is that the maximum recoverable amount is linked to profit gained or loss avoided by the contravening persons.
With section 90A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (U.K.)
, as is the case in Singapore under section 234, therefore, investor actions against issuers are severely hampered by the lack of a fraud on the market theory, which militates against any actions by most investors due to the costs of securities litigation and collective action problems. Under the statutory provisions in Singapore, it may also be difficult to ascertain investor loss, which is something that has recently troubled the U.S. courts. Further, it relates that loss to the wrongdoer's gain, which makes sense in the case of insider trading (where, conversely, the calculation of the loss may not be meaningful), but less so in cases of poor corporate disclosure. In contrast, we will see that actions taken by a company against its directors for false and misleading disclosures may be treated as analogous to traditional common law or equitable fraud, where causation requirements are quite relaxed, and it is likely that losses do 90 (4) provide that a claimant's loss is measured by the difference in the price at which the products were applied for, or agreed to be applied for, by the insider or the other person and the price at which they would have been likely to have been disposed of in a disposal made at the time of the application or the time of the agreement, as the case may be, if the information had been generally available. The latter method of calculating loss in insider trading cases is similar to that in Australia's Corporations Act 2001 (Cth.), s. 1043L(2). 92 It is difficult to take a purposive interpretation and hypothesise that the likely price should be that in which the seller had sold without contravening the law by making full disclosure, as the means to disclose corporate information are usually not in the seller's hands in cases of insider trading.
not have to even flow from the falsity of the misrepresentation. 93 It may therefore be preferable to have the loss proved at the corporate level rather than at the shareholder level. But this requires a fraud standard of liability.
C. Fraud as the Standard of Liability
In his Final Report, Davies said that "the tort of deceit is a form of wrongdoing developed by the common law specifically to deal with misstatements," 94 in contrast with the tort of negligence which applies generally to different factual matrices. While there may have been a time when gross negligence was seen as "misfeasance or breach of trust," 95 it has been pointed out that the gap between the two was never properly explained, 96 especially as liability for gross negligence depended on the establishment of a duty of care (as with negligence simpliciter). It is clear that the concern with negligence liability is that it is over-encompassing and may lead to defensive reporting, 98 where less useful information is provided by issuers than would otherwise have been the case. It has also been pointed out that "[f]irms subject to the Federal securities law may, in some situations, rationally choose to obscure or delay negative information in order to maximize welfare of shareholders at the time of the fraud," 99 which partly explains the scienter requirement in 10b-5 actions. It is difficult to fault the corporation where it is balancing the interests of different constituencies within it, which is why it should not be the defendant in securities disclosure cases. Even where it can be a defendant as in the case of section 90A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (U.K.), there is presently no liability for delayed disclosures, and the U.K. Government has accepted Davies' recommendation to require dishonesty before delayed disclosures are actionable. 100 In contrast, the civil liability provision in section 203 of the Securities and Futures Act (Singapore) catches negligent issuers that fail to notify its securities exchange of such information as is required under its listing rules or other requirements. And, in Australia continuous disclosure liability is strict but subject to a due diligence defence for parties other than the issuer entity. 101 Fox's proposed civil liability system is also that directors, officers and third party certifiers such as investment banks should have liability attached to them in periodic disclosure in a way similar to the K.) , that "(t)he risk of being disbelieved also means that, at the margin, fraud liability generates some incentive to check the facts before speaking." 106 The imposition of evidential burdens against the statement maker helps where the corporation is the defendant. Without it, it is not obvious how fraudulent liability is to be attributable to the corporation for periodic financial statements, since that is a statement put out by the corporation where the input of many individuals are aggregated. 107 There would be a need to identify the relevant person whose fraudulent intent could be attributed to the company. 108 The new corporate derivative liability provisions in Division 5 Subdivision 1 of the Securities and Futures Act (Singapore) requires that an offence has been created by an individual where there is proof of "consent or connivance" or a contravention (leading to a civil penalty or claim only) that is "attributable to the negligence" on the part of a corporation. 109 There may be difficulties in this as the language is taken from section 331 of the Securities and Futures Act (Singapore), but that applies in the reverse scenario, i.e., of an officer of the body corporate being liable because the body corporate has contravened a provision in the Act. With these new provisions, we still have to identify a second officer within the corporation, perhaps on some kind of agency or "directing mind and will" basis, 110 that consented, connived in or was negligent in the first officer's wrongdoing. In contrast, the evidential approach allows adverse inferences to be drawn against a corporation where its officers fail to explain how a periodic financial statement was put out inaccurately given the structural procedures or safeguards they had or had not installed in the corporation.
At the same time, directors, particularly in closely held companies, will clearly find it difficult to argue that they were not reckless about the outcome of their failure to comply with disclosure requirements, and so a negligence standard is not required in Singapore. In September 2006, SGX amended rule 705 of its listing rules to require directors of a listed company to "provide a confirmation that, to the best of their knowledge, nothing has come to the attention of the board of directors which may render the interim financial results to be false or misleading." This attributes a statement directly to a director, and is a potential source of liability under section 199 of the Securities and Futures Act (Singapore) . 111 This would be the case particularly where there is a structural bias that would tilt any decision of the directors in favour of one of the corporate constituencies, such as the major shareholder. In such instances, Hill and McDonnell, in their analysis of the good faith standard (which is distinct from due care and loyalty-conflict duties) for directors in the U.S. (which in the Disney case was set at a "conscious disregard of one's responsibilities," 112 and is close to the recklessness standard discussed here) have argued that bad faith can be proved by both showing structural bias and gross negligence. 113 Similarly, it would be difficult for a director to shift the evidential burden imposed on him where objective facts suggested that he was reckless in not making the necessary inquiries against a background showing structural bias favouring a major shareholder. The concept here is not dissimilar to "fraud on a power", 114 where it is the office and its nature that determines the extent of the duty imposed on the director, and not the power itself. "No power is fiduciary per se"; 115 and it is the fact that it is vested in an office holder that it becomes a fiduciary power, which then sets boundaries on 110 In cases of fraud, it appears that only the state of mind of the company's directing mind and will is attributed to it: 111 The Singapore Exchange (SGX) argued during the trial of Airocean directors who were facing charges of consenting to Airocean's "reckless failure" to notify the SGX of relevant information concerning its CEO's questioning by the CPIB that a duty of disclosure falls on all board members, including independent directors: Jamie Lee, "Airocean trial opens with listing rules debate" Business Times the exercise of that power. 116 Such an approach would be sensitive to the context in which the director obtained his appointment, the position he currently holds and the particular transaction being considered. A negligence standard is thus unnecessary as its chilling effect will result in independently minded directors being too cautious in generating corporate information, which can lead to too little useful information alongside too much irrelevant information. Other directors can, however, be shown to be reckless in exercising their powers of disclosure through proof of a failure to meet objective standards against a background of structural bias and conflicts of interest. 117 In summary, a fraudulent standard of liability is apposite to both corporate and director liability (criminal/regulatory, but also civilly to investors, if any) in securities disclosure cases. The duty is to care, not to take care. But it is hard to envision the corporation as a separate entity when it comes to liability in insider type structures given the structural bias that exists in that directors often act in the interests of the major shareholder rather than the shareholders as a whole. Liability should attach to directors or controlling shareholders (as shadow directors if not more directly) or officers that in fact control the flow of information within the corporation, and who have abused the position they were in. To a large extent, however, existing securities actions outside of the U.S. by investors against issuers are thwarted by the need for each of them to prove reliance on the misstatements and the causal link between misstatement and loss (with the problem in Singapore having to also link loss and wrongdoer profit). Consequently, the concerns expressed above concerning issuer liability to compensate investors (as opposed to paying civil penalties to regulators) are at the moment largely a U.S.-centric problem. Our focus will now shift towards the corporate issuer being the plaintiff with the directors/officers/controlling shareholders the defendants. Even here, the argument made will be that fraud or recklessness should effectively be the standard of liability, despite the fact that directors owe extant duties of care and skill to the company.
V. Investors Should not be Plaintiffs

A. No Aggregate Loss within the Shareholder Constituency and Abusive Class Actions
But if corporate information can affect different generations of shareholders differently, it could conceivably be argued that losing shareholders should still be allowed to seek compensation, if not from the issuer then someone else, like the directors. 118 So, for example, in a case where a company has suffered losses from poor investments, it is the non-disclosure of those losses that creates problems from a securities law perspective as it favours existing shareholders at the expense of future shareholders, in that the former could sell their shares before disclosure and avoid a loss, and a new shareholder might buy in the period after the market had been misled and take the loss that comes with the disclosure. It is quite clearly the investors who purchased at or after the time that disclosure should have been made who had, in fact, incurred financial losses. The disclosure of the negative information is how the loss at the corporate level translates itself into a loss at the shareholder level which, due to the bifurcated structure of ownership created by the separate corporate form, is a complicated process, as we shall see. But, there may not in fact be any distinct shareholder loss as it could be a zero sum game amongst the investor community in that the positions of buyers and sellers net off. 119 Further, John Coffee Jr. has argued that private securities ligation by shareholders against issuers for failing to satisfy continuous disclosure requirements served neither to deter nor to properly compensate investors because of the "circularity problem." 120 The circularity problem is such that a diversified investor really only sees transaction costs 121 in securities litigation against corporations as it is just as likely be an investor that is holding onto its shares and thus being indirectly a defendant, and one buying in after the point in which proper disclosure (we are assuming the withholding of bad news here) should have been made, where they form part of the plaintiff class. 122 More relevantly, perhaps, with some diversified investors more likely to hold than to trade (and holders have no standing to sue), they may end up more often having to indirectly pay out to trading investors than they receive. Worse, even where they did buy in at the relevant time, and so may be part of a plaintiff group, their propensity to hold may mean that they may not be able to prove a causative loss as they would not have sold by the time the action is brought or settled, and we have seen that this may now be required of plaintiffs in U.S. 10b-5 cases. 123 But compensation for a particular class of investors, particularly undiversified ones, can be justified if there are good reasons for it. And even if compensation fails as a rationale, there is still the deterrence argument. As we have seen, Fox has argued that private securities litigation to enforce disclosure is intended to enhance corporate governance and is less about investor protection. 124 He thought that disclosure also reduces the disclosing entity's cost of capital as transparency increases liquidity for the company's shares. So investors benefit from disclosure indirectly through better corporate governance and higher stock liquidity. Fox argued that the cost of private securities litigation that is ultimately borne by them is thus a fee that they have to bear for the enhancement of corporate disclosure and governance. 125 Still, he recognised that private securities litigation in the form of actions by investors against issuers was really a second best solution to create private deterrence-his preference discussed below was for reform to permit issuers to be plaintiffs and for directors and officers, as well as third party intermediaries, to be the defendants. 126 Fisch on the other hand argues for a broader conception of investor protection, one which enhances price efficiency in the markets and hence helps to discipline corporate managers. It is consistent with Goshen and Parchomovsky's point about the aim of securities regulation 127 which is that acquiring information is costly and the law tries to lower that for professional investors (Fisch prefers "informed traders"). 128 Disclosure, in particular, reduces their search costs and so makes them willing to pay more for the shares. Informed investors trade on firm specific information unlike diversified investors and they are more affected by fraudulent information -so they suffer a "special damage" of sorts. But this then impacts both on the company, as well as existing shareholders, whose payment of damages is the fee they bear to encourage informed investors to do their job properly. But distinguishing informed traders from uninformed traders may be difficult in practice as the latter would often also claim reliance on the fraudulent information. Thus, while Fisch thought that this deals best with the circularity problem highlighted above, she asks for a "reformulation" of the fraud on the market approach in private securities litigation. 129 But a more fundamental objection to her argument which Fisch acknowledges is that gains and losses in securities actions by investors are not neutral in that longer term investors that hold may have to pay out to short term investors, who because of frequent trades are likely to buy and to have sold by the time the company has to pay out. 130 So stated the zero sum game is systematically rigged in favour of one particular group or generation of shareholders who stand to win over time from the inter-generational conflict. 131 There would be enormous political difficulties in compensating trading investors like hedge funds at the expense of holding investors such as pension funds under these circumstances. 132 The public will, at the least, cry foul at the likely abuse by the winners in such a system, even if the differences between such funds are possibly much less than is often perceived. 133 
B. Company as the Proper Plaintiff-Damage?
Separately, Fox has argued even more fervently about the social value of disclosure, regardless of whether the issuer is selling new shares at the same time. 134 He has proposed a civil liability regime that is just as strong in enforcing corporate disclosure regardless of whether any fundraising is occurring at the same time. While there is issuer liability where it offers new shares for subscription or purchase, he argues that the basic private civil liability system in all instances should be one that provides for corporate actions against individual wrongdoers and third parties like investment banks. This proposal avoids the criticism above, i.e., that traders win at the expense of holders, which is a drawback with investor actions, although arguably both sets of investors could have already priced this into their respective valuation of securities.
From a corporate law perspective, however, Booth has argued that derivative actions are more appropriate for securities fraud actions but that directors should be liable only when they make a gain which would in effect limit it to insider trading (at least at the federal level). 135 And in a more recent article, 136 he argues that in the case of many direct class actions brought by investors under 10b-5, the losses claimed for are often more in the nature of corporate losses, and investors should have claimed for them through a derivative action. This is true in the case of the fundamental loss that forms the basis of the bad news, that is, the underlying loss suffered by the business, which is not actionable as it is not a disclosure problem. But it is also true of capitalisation loss (change in earnings multiplier) which is the reputational damage resulting from the series of poor disclosures and the increased difficulty in accessing the capital markets, which was Fox's concern. And in the case of feedback loss, which is caused to the corporation by the litigation which shareholders derive their loss from, that disappears if class actions cannot proceed on the capitalisation loss. In the end, he feels that it is for the U.S. courts to rectify the problem since the classification of an action is within their purview, and the securities fraud class action there was really court created. 137 But it is possible to argue that issuer corporations can still prove a recoverable loss (other than the fundamental loss which may have been the result of a different breach of duty) even where the wrongdoing insiders do not make a gain from fraudulent disclosures. There is, at the least, the reputational damage suffered by the corporation, although that may be hard to quantify. In Singapore, however, Vita Health 138 provides an interesting remedial solution. The managing director's wrong in this case consisted of misstating the accounts and this painted a positive picture of the company in order to attract outside investors to buy his shares. The court held, however, that the company itself was also entitled to substantial damages against the managing director even though the losses were not in fact suffered by the company. Because of his fraudulent conduct, the managing director was bound to the 135 misleading picture he had created in inducing shareholders to buy into the company. Equity, in a sense, deemed done that which ought to be done. The amount claimed at the corporate level would then feed into share prices in a manner determined by investors.
In Vita Health, Rajah J.C. (as he then was) utilised the remoteness rules in Doyle, 139 i.e., that a wrongdoer is liable for all the losses resulting from a fraudulently induced transaction, including consequential losses. Forseeability is not necessary in this instance. Unlike recent U.S. securities fraud on the market cases, nothing was said about a more stringent loss causation test, which could mean that intervening factors like a general market collapse, which in today's financial markets is in truth always foreseeable, would not prevent full recovery. 140 But this is right for, as Kumaralingam Amirthalingam has argued in a different context, damages should sometimes be payable where the wrongdoer has created an unacceptable risk for which he should be liable, 141 where evidential difficulties make it impossible to prove the chain of causation connecting the wrong to the harm. While that was in the context of negligence in the modern post-industrial world, where such an approach is highly controversial, the important recent medical negligence decision in Surender Singh s/o Jagdish Singh v. Li Man Kay 142 has applied what Amirthalingam termed the "formerly discredited approach" 143 in McGhee v. National Coal Board 144 in finding that there was a sufficient causal connection where the defendants' act "made the risk of death to the Deceased more probable." 145 The argument for such a liberal causation rule in the case of fraud is less controvertible, and in Vita Health it was not complicated by the need to define loss at the shareholder level. But although the claim is at the corporate level, it is for the serious risk of shareholder losses resulting from corporate misstatements. But this ultimate harm is hard to quantify or sometimes even conceive of and so the focus should be on the intermediate harm (which are the risks from the overstatement). 146 The harm is to corporate governance and reputation, and instead of asking about reasonable foreseeability, the question is the form or level of recovery that is reasonable. 147 Framed in such a way, it was clearly reasonable that the wrongdoer was held to the misstatements as if they were true. Such a technique has been used to make a fiduciary hold a bribe on constructive trust. 148 But it is policy laden, as Rajah J.C. observed:
In assessing damages for fraud, a mechanical approach is to be eschewed in favour of flexibility. The multi-faceted dimensions of fraud require pragmatism and malleability from the court in fashioning the appropriate remedy. Creative accounting may require creative remedies. While the deterrent factor may sometimes be cloaked in an award of damages, it should not be forgotten. 149 But such flexibility is not unusual in the case of fraud claims. Rajah J.C. acknowledged that in deciding on the time at which to assess damages, the House of Lords in Smith New Court Securities Ltd. v. Scrimgeour Vickers (Asset Management) Ltd. 150 had previously rejected a strict "date of transaction" approach based on the difference between the price paid and value of shares received on the date of the transaction. Instead, the House applied the general test for fraud, where the loss does not have to flow from the falsity of the misrepresentation, which provided it greater leeway. Approving of Lord Steyn's speech in that case, Rajah J.C. thought that his Lordship "took pains to stress the importance of deterrence as a policy consideration in assessing damages for fraud. Intentional torts are rightly singled out for special consideration." 151 It is therefore a matter of policy that there could be a stricter loss causation requirement in the case of shareholder actions for disclosure fraud, which are difficult to quantify and are brought against issuers (and their shareholders) that do not benefit from the fraud, than at the corporate level where the claim is brought against persons who may benefit from the wrong, and even if not, are directly responsible for it. It attests to the different kinds of wrong and harm that are recognised in society where, with fraud, the goal is perhaps more, or at least as much, deterrence as compensation. 152 
C. Directors as Defendants-Why not Negligence Liability?
Vita Health suggests that in Singapore, corporate disclosure can be enhanced through the enforcement of extant directors' duties to act bona fide in the best interest of the company which are owed to the company. Here, what good faith really means is that the fiduciary cannot exercise powers of disclosure that have been vested in him in bad faith. 153 But it was argued above that fraud or recklessness is the preferred standard for criminal liability, regulatory penalties or investor civil claims as cases like Wang Ziyi Able have developed a basis for using evidentiary burdens to prove the necessary intent and are thus more nuanced and predictable. This may not be the case with the good faith duty where subjective dishonesty has usually been found to be required for there to be bad faith, unlike the more objective obligation imposed on directors to, for example, exercise their powers for proper purposes, 154 which is another technique Richard Nolan identifies as having been used to control fiduciary powers. 155 It has also been argued elsewhere how the good faith duty on directors in Singapore has been influenced by the hands off or no second-guessing approach courts take to business decisions without clear exposition of how it interacts with the objective duty of care and skill, and that in contrast the proper purpose rule could serve as the basis for a duty of disclosure, though there owed to present and future shareholders. 156 But this then compels us to ask why it is not enough to rely on extant duties of care and skill where it is just the company bringing an action against directors or individual wrongdoers for disclosure violations? 157 The arguments made above as to why the fraud standard of liability was apposite for criminal, regulatory or investor actions are still relevant here, namely that there would be a chilling effect on directors and officers were negligence to be the standard of liability in actions that are brought by their companies against them, even though this is likely for sums much smaller than in the case of investor class actions (given the U.S. experience). This would be particularly true of independent or outside directors. It is possibly for this reason that section 463 of the Companies Act 2006 (U.K.) makes a director liable to the company for misstatements in the directors' report, remuneration report or summary financial statement derived from either of these reports only in the case of fraud (knowledge or recklessness). This can be seen as some form of business judgment rule protecting directors from negligence liability (which jurisdictions like the U.S., Australia and Malaysia have recognised as applicable to directors' duties generally but which Singapore, like the U.K., does not have in its true form as opposed to a deferential approach taken towards decisions of directors discussed in the previous paragraph). 158 This though creates some form of safe harbour only in the specific context of certain financial disclosures.
Yet, with the insider directors, recklessness can be proved by showing gross negligence against a background of structural bias, where directors are in a position where they are likely to act against the corporate interest and in favour of another constituency, 159 which would be the major shareholder in a closely-held company. The point has been made that courts can discern a breach of the duty of loyalty far more easily that they do the duty of care. In the case of listed companies, it has been suggested that it should be left to professional analysts, aided by mandatory disclosure rules, to monitor the duty of care. 160 The courts' comparative advantage is in picking up more culpable wrongdoing. A limited business judgment rule for directors in the context of financial disclosures would also be consistent with the joint and several liability that could attach to controlling shareholders under section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act 1934 (U.S.), which applies "unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action." With controlling shareholders, therefore, a provision may be needed to create a duty of good faith, whereas in the case of directors, section 463 of the Companies Act 2006 (U.K.) serves to restrict the application of extant negligence liability which could otherwise lead to the production of too little useful, and too much superfluous, information.
In any case, negligence liability may not help in the Vita Health situation as it was the bad faith finding of Rajah J.C. that led to the very favourable causation rules which permitted the company to show that it had suffered a loss. The reality is that in many cases of misleading or delayed disclosures, the company would find it difficult to quantify its loss under traditional causation principles since the disclosures impact on share prices more directly. We have seen that Booth identified the capitalisation loss or reputational damage suffered by the company as the main avenue of recovery but even he was careful to advocate restricting issuer claims to profits made by the wrongdoing directors. 161 An account of profits is usually only available where there is a breach of a statutory or equitable right. Equitable fraud must also be present for the technique used in Vita Health to work, viz. that the wrongdoer is held to the truth of the misstatements that he made, which can be seen as a way of redressing the reputational harm suffered by the company. But such harm is created far more evidently by directors acting in an egregious manner than where they are merely negligent. Consequently, while it may seem like the tail wagging the dog, the whole basis of corporate recovery in the context of disclosure violations is based on fraud or recklessness on the part of directors, officers or controlling shareholders and its remedial consequences are inextricably tied up with, and, in turn influences, the applicable standard of liability.
In Maxwell 162 it was held that a director was not criminally liable for breaches of his statutory duties of care and skill (and good faith) due to the misleading and deceptive conduct by the corporation (as well as breach of the prospectus rules) in raising funds without a disclosure document. The court said that he had not made any statement referring to an offer of securities that could be attributed to him 163 and thought that the statutory provisions on directors duties (largely an expanded version of section 157 of the Companies Act (Singapore) that is presently being considered in Singapore), 164 while it did not require a formal proof of damage to the corporation, still required that there was foreseeable risk that the directors' act or omission might harm the corporation. Both the duties of care and good faith are not duties about 160 Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 1. 161 Booth, Future of Securities Regulation, supra note 122. 162 Supra note 40. 163 Ibid. at para. 124. 164 It appears that the Singapore Government will take a wait and see attitude to how the codification of directors' duties in the UK, and the statutory formulation in Australia (which is not exhaustive), will pan out: see behaving well in the abstract, but doing well by the company, 165 and as such it is difficult to envisage meaningful negligence liability on the part of directors in the context of a disclosure violation where it can be shown that the company suffers a recoverable loss. It is easier in the context of good faith, especially in its bad faith formulation, where the company's image is tarnished by the recklessness of its directors. It is perhaps for this reason too that in cases of fraud which impacts on a company's outside dealings, it appears that only the state of mind of the company's directing mind and will is attributed to it, and not that of an officer that is otherwise attributed to the company in non-fraud situations. 166 This is because an officer's fraud in relation to a third party is also one against the company. Often, it is also the case that the relevant misstatement or non-disclosure involves a risk or forward-looking statement, and not a known event. At common law, it has always been held that only statements of fact, not opinion or future intention, are actionable. It is only if that opinion or intention is not honestly held that the law intervenes. 167 But the relevant information may relate to past events, and are clearly then statements of fact that are actionable per se. Even here, however, it can be argued that corrective disclosure has hard-to-determine causative effects on the market given that it would have to be ascertained "how disclosure of the omitted or misrepresented information would affect investor beliefs regarding the magnitude of future cash payouts and the likelihood of receiving those payments." 168 Directors and officers would be wary about how their statements are interpreted given the usual rumours in the market, some of which would have already fed into the share price. Directors may therefore be trying to see when and how disclosure could be made in a way that impacts least on the shareholder community (present and future, and sometimes even other constituencies like employees) in a way that fulfils their duty to exercise their powers in an even-handed way. Too much liability would lead to overly defensive reporting. This may explain why on 10 March 2009, Neptune Orient Lines ("NOL") declined to comment when queried whether it was intending a rights issue as had been suggested in a Dow Jones report. Its share price continued to fall until it unequivocally denied plans of a rights issue three days later. For this it received a public reprimand from the SGX. 169 While this may have been appropriate, civil liability, which exists somewhat further up the hierarchy of sanctions, may not be unless fraud was present, or there was some kind of insider activity in the market which accompanied the rumours. NOL's board was placed in a difficult position given the speculation and the worldwide market sentiment at that time. It might not have been a position yet to deny the rumours outright, but could have said that there was only a possibility or probability of there being a rights issue or not, as the case may be. But this information was already circulating in the market. It is therefore not clear that a vague holding reply, if made in good faith, should be actionable given that 165 Maxwell, supra note 40 at para. 102. 166 the investors attached their own assessments as to the mathematical chances of the relevant event occurring. These corporate statements are not made in a face-to-face or one-to-one situation but are made to a diverse market ready to pounce on every word. In brief, it has been argued that a duty of disclosure founded on negligence liability is not appropriate if the goal is to generate useful corporate information. There are many instances in practice where the officers of a company have to take a good faith business decision not to disclose information for reasons such as its incipient nature, or conversely, they may take a considered decision to disclose such information because of the fear of a false market developing which later turns out to be premature. Corporate actions against directors for bad faith or recklessness, however, are a better fit, given that courts in Singapore have also defined corporate harm resulting from intentional torts quite broadly, which is consistent with most fraud claims. In the case of directors, there is a need to offer some form of safe harbour from negligence liability in the context of financial disclosures along the lines of section 463 of the Companies Act 2006 (U.K.). This would then, in effect, make it less of a duty to disclose timeously and accurately, and more a power to disclose that cannot be abused as discussed earlier. In the case of controlling shareholders that do not owe any extant duty of care to the company, however, a statutory provision may be required to establish a standard of liability where they are party to a disclosure violation. Here, not being fiduciaries, any applicable good faith formulation is different in that while regard must be had to the company's interest, such persons are not expected to systematically prioritise it. 170 So a clear rule based on the fraudulent or reckless disregard of the continuous disclosure rules would be useful.
VI. Conclusion
The gist of securities litigation to enforce corporate disclosure is the deterrence of a director or officer from creating an unacceptable risk to shareholders by being reckless with the powers of disclosure vested in him, given the reach and difficulties of ascertaining the effects of breaches of that power. It is to prevent the fraud or improper use of that power. This can be proved by background evidence showing his links to the major shareholder or another constituency, in circumstances where he cannot explain why he did not do what the reasonable director or officer in his position would have. The use of objective facts to prove subjective intent is a broader application of Wang Ziyi Able where fraud or recklessness was considered in the narrower confines of section 199 of the Securities and Futures Act (Singapore) . 171 For such an act or omission in relation to the power given to him to disclose corporate information, a director is liable for the loss "suffered" by the corporation on a generous causation or remoteness rule drawn from common law fraud. The important authority here for us is Vita Health. 172 However, it may not be enough to leave it to common law directors' duties alone, with negligence being too wide and needing a limited 170 business judgment rule in the context of financial disclosures. At the same time, the private enforcement of continuous disclosure would be facilitated by statutorily encapsulating the need for controlling shareholders to make disclosure properly. What should also be considered is the widening of section 216A of the Companies Act (Singapore) to allow statutory derivative actions to be brought in the case of publicly listed companies, which is now the position in many jurisdictions around the world. 173 The problem remains that in the current environment where investors can sue directors and officers, in the U.S. under 10b-5 and elsewhere at common law (which this article has argued should not be the primary mode of private enforcement), with Director and Officer (D&O) insurance, "little liability remains with the directors." 174 This should be less of a problem in cases where the company brings an action against its directors and officers for fraud as the corporation is most cognisant about the indemnity and insurance arrangements within the corporate structure to see if a suit is advantageous. 175 Even so, Fox has suggested for his proposed civil liability regime in which the issuer is the plaintiff, only litigation fees should be payable by insurers, 176 and no other indemnification or insurance of the directors and officers be allowed otherwise. But this would necessitate a major change to section 172(2) of the Companies Act (Singapore), which presently allows liability insurance (but it is less clear about insurers providing upfront payments of litigation fees), 177 as well as corporate indemnities (although there is some uncertainty over whether this can cover third party claims). 178 Changes could also be made to prevent indemnification or insurance only in derivative or corporate actions against the directors and officers, but this could be seen as still too much interference with market forces, as the terms of insurance are usually quite freely negotiated. 179 Perhaps the easiest statutory
